Background: Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), hepatitis B virus (HBV), hepatitis C virus (HCV), and other viruses remain occupational risks for both surgeons and patients in the operating room environment. In the past, this concern attracted great attention, but recently, this subject has been given much less attention. Methods: Review of the literature over the past 50 years on occupational risks of viral infection in the operating room. Results: Transmission of HIV still looms as a potential pathogen in the operating room, but no case has been documented in the United States. Infection with HBV can be prevented by a safe and effective vaccine. Chronic HCV infection is present in more than three million U.S. residents and remains a risk that can be managed only by adhering to strict infection control practices and avoiding blood exposure. Conclusions: The risks of viral infection in the operating room remain the same as a decade ago even though attention to this issue has waned. The avoidance of blood exposure to prevent transmission of both known and unknown blood-borne pathogens continues to be a goal for all surgeons.
H ealthcare workers and, especially, surgical personnel are at risk for occupational viral infections from human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), hepatitis B virus (HBV), and hepatitis C virus (HCV) from various types of blood contacts [1] . Cuts from scalpels, punctures from bone fragments, injuries from needle sticks, and eye=mucocutaneous contact are potential sources of transmission [2] . Furthermore, transmission of these viral pathogens to the patient during surgical, dental, dialysis, and endoscopic procedures from infected healthcare workers or from cross-transmission from other infected patients attributable to breaches in infection control practices continues to be a source of concern [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] . This article reviews the status of the viral blood-borne pathogens and the continued threat they pose for patients and healthcare workers.
Historical Perspectives
For nearly 60 years, healthcare workers have been acquiring occupational infections. ''Serum hepatitis'' cases were reported in the early 1950s [10, 11] , and at one point, it was estimated that nearly 250 healthcare workers died annually from occupationally-acquired HBV infection [12] . Surgeons were recognized as being at particular risk for infection with this virus. The HBV infections commonly were occult, with only about 5% resulting in chronic disease, and indifference was the general attitude [13] .
However, in 1981, the recognition of Pneumocystis pneumonia in young men without clinical reason for immunosuppression led to the recognition of HIV as the putative cause of the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) [14] . Transmission of the infection was identified quickly as the consequence of exposure to blood and body fluids. In contrast to the reaction to HBV infection, the social stigma of AIDS led to inappropriate responses at multiple levels of society. Many people called for mandatory screening of patients and even healthcare providers for HIV and HBV. The identification of a third pathogen, HCV, formerly known as non-A, non-B hepatitis, and the development of a serologic assay in 1989 confirmed that HCV had a greater prevalence in society than HIV and HBV together, adding to social anxiety [15] .
In 1991, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported possible transmission of HIV infection to a cluster of six patients during invasive dental procedures by a single infected dentist [5] . These cases impacted federal and state policy directly because of public concern that there would be an outbreak of HIV infections transmitted from physicians to patients. In 1991, the CDC recommended that healthcare workers infected with HIV or HBV inform their patients of their serologic status and be reviewed by an expert panel before engaging in exposure-prone procedures [16] . Later that year, Congress enacted a statute requiring each state, as a condition of receiving Public Health Service funds, to certify that CDC guidelines ''or their equivalent'' had been instituted [17] . All 50 states responded with written policies. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) then issued requirements governing certain behaviors in the operating room [18] .
SURGICAL INFECTIONS
The furor over HIV and HBV as occupational risks reached a crescendo in the mid-1990s, but by the end of the decade, the furor had subsided. Operating room rates of HIV transmission were minuscule, with no case of transmission documented in the United States. The American College of Surgeons (ACS) took a strong position that the risk of transmission from patients, or to patients, in the operating room was negligible when appropriate infection control practices were employed [19, 20] . As of 1996, marked declines were reported in the incidences of new HIV infections and deaths as a consequence of education programs and the use of highlyactive anti-retroviral therapy (HAART) in the treatment of established infections [21, 22] .
Unfortunately, attitudes about occupational infection have returned to the indifference of the pre-AIDS era. Public and professional discussion of occupational infection in healthcare providers or risks to patients has quieted, being ignited only sporadically by the occasional cluster of HCV infections when infection control practices are applied poorly or ignored. Are eye shields or double gloves worn with the same frequency today as in the mid-1990s? Probably not! The pathogens in the surgical population are still there, and the risks are still real. Continued awareness and sensitivity to the specific viral pathogens and to easily applied preventive strategies still are needed.
HIV Infection
There are approximately one million people living with HIV infection in the United States, with about 35,000-38,000 new cases and 16,000-18,000 deaths per year [23] . There has been little change in the number of cases of documented occupational infections of healthcare workers or of epidemiologically suspected cases since 2001 [24] . There have been 57 documented cases of occupational transmission of HIV where individuals seroconverted after having negative serology at the time of the index exposure event ( [25] . On the basis of these observations combined with the serological surveillance study done with a large population of orthopedic surgeons that demonstrated no HIV infection in the absence of non-occupational risk factors [26] , it can be concluded that surgical activity is associated seldom with HIV transmission to surgeons or to patients.
In prospective studies of healthcare workers, the average risk for HIV transmission after a percutaneous exposure to HIV-infected blood has been estimated to be approximately 0.3% (95% confidence interval [CI] 0.2%, 0.5%) [27] and after a mucous membrane exposure, approximately 0.09% (CI 0.006, 0.5%) [28] . Most transmissions have occurred in nurses and medical technologists. Most injuries in which transmission has occurred have been dramatic, not superficial needle sticks. Either mucus membrane or percutaneous injury requires consideration for post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) with antiretroviral chemoprophylaxis.
Recommendations for PEP are summarized in Table 2 [29] . Percutaneous injuries to patients with known HIV infection should trigger a basic two-drug regimen if the disease was asymptomatic in the index patient or a three-drug (or more) regimen when the index patient has symptomatic infection. The drug choices recommended are listed in Table 3 , and the number of antiretroviral agents continues to expand. Prophylaxis should be initiated as soon as possible after exposure and be continued for four weeks. Because of indeterminate issues of severity of disease in the index patient, the volume of inocula in mucous membrane exposure, the vast choices of different antiretroviral drugs, and the potential toxicity of PEP, it usually is necessary to have an infectious disease specialist knowledgeable in HIV infection manage the course of PEP. Serologic post-exposure testing for HIV and other blood-borne viruses is recommended at six weeks, 12 weeks, and six months after the exposure.
Hepatitis B Infection
There are more than one million people in the U.S. with chronic HBV infection [30] . The infection became widely disseminated by intravenous drug abuse, sexual transmission, and, prior to 1970, blood transfusions. Hepatitis B has been a particularly common occupational infection for surgeons, with 25-30% of surgeons in the >60-year-old group having serologic evidence of prior acute infection [31] . Fortunately, only a small minority developed chronic infection. However, chronic infection is a serious situation because it leads to end-stage liver disease, hepatocellular carcinoma, and portal hypertension. Because 70-75% of acute HBV infections are clinically occult, many surgeons were unaware of chronic infection until clinical sequelae occurred with advanced disease, often 20 or more years after acute infection [13] .
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cutaneous needle sticks are associated with a 30% risk of transmission of acute infection [32] . Numerous clinical reports have identified that surgeons who have high viral titers, commonly identified by the presence of the e antigen, are infectious for their patients [33] [34] [35] .
A highly effective HBV vaccine has been available for 25 years and has reduced dramatically the risks of chronic HBV infection for healthcare personnel [36] . The current vaccine is produced by recombinant technology and has an excellent record of safety. Vaccination is achieved by administration of a three-dose regimen, with the second and third doses being given one and six months after the initial dose. It is important that a surface-antibody response be documented, because 5% of individuals do not respond to the initial vaccination series. Non-responders should undergo a second series of three vaccinations [37] . It is now mandated by OSHA regulations that all healthcare personnel be offered the HBV vaccine by their employers, and there is no legitimate reason for any surgeon not to be immunized. Nevertheless, a recent study of transplant surgeons found that 10% had not been, and another 20% had not completed the full three-dose regimen [38] .
Effective PEP after exposure to blood of an infected patient requires that surgeons know their status for HBV antibodies [39] . A strongly positive surface antibody test means that the surgeon is protected from the virus. If immunization has been performed and the surgeon is weakly positive for the surface antibody or is non-reactive, administration of a dose of HBV immunoglobulin is necessary, and a booster dose of HBV vaccine should be given immediately. If the surgeon or other exposed healthcare worker has not been immunized at the time of an exposure and the exposed individual is seronegative for HBV surface antibody, then a dose of HBV immunoglobulin should be given; the full vaccination series should be started immediately. The unvaccinated surgeon positive for the HBV core antibody has had a prior infection and does not need PEP. However, the antibodypositive but unvaccinated surgeon should have followup studies to determine if there is chronic HBV infection.
Should the surgeon with HBV infection continue to practice surgery? If he or she is antigen-negative, the prior acute infection has resolved, and there are no health risks for the surgeon or the patients. Antigen-positive surgeons should be tested for the e antigen. If positive, they should consult with a locally convened group of experts to advise them about continuing surgical practice [20] . Whether positive or not for the e antigen, treatments for chronic HBV are now available, and the chronically-infected surgeon should receive appropriate care.
Hepatitis C Infection
Hepatitis C is by far the most serious blood-borne viral infection of the current era. There are some 3-4 million people in the U.S. with chronic HCV infection [40] . It is associated with intravenous drug abuse, multiple sexual partners, and blood transfusion prior to 1992 [41] (Table 4) . As with HBV, it is an occult acute infection for the majority of patients, but unlike HBV, more than 60% of acute events result in chronic disease. The infection is associated with a 2% frequency of transmission with percutaneous exposure in the healthcare setting [42] . Surgeons have higher rates of chronic HCV infection than the public in general, and percutaneous operating room exposure is believed to be the cause. Although the efficiency of transmission is less with HCV than with HBV, the greater number of people in society who carry chronic HCV infection and the higher rates of chronic infection that follow an acute episode make HCV a greater source of concern for surgeons.
Yet another source of concern is that no effective vaccine exists to prevent HCV infection. Moreover, resolved acute infection does not appear to confer long-term immunity, and reinfection may occur in the same host. There are multiple serotypes of HCV that add to the problems of vaccine development. Also, unlike the immunoglobulin preparation for HBV, the HCV immunoglobulin has not been demonstrated to prevent infection after exposure in either experimental [43] or clinical [44] studies.
Prevention of exposure in the operating room is the mainstay of prevention of this occupational infection. Immediate use of anti-viral treatment has not been demonstrated to be of value in preventing HCV infection after percutaneous exposure and is not recommended [45] . Rather, exposed individuals are followed and if infection has been transmitted, therapeutic anti-viral treatment is initiated.
The high-risk exposure event should be handled in a systematic fashion. The HCV status of the source patient should be either known or documented by antibody testing. Baseline HCV antibody and alanine aminotransferase activity of the exposed surgeon should be obtained at the time of the event. Followup antibody testing should be performed at 4-6 months, because seroconversion may require this long. Anxiety of the exposed individual may lead to reverse transcriptase testing for HCV ribonucleic acid (RNA) 4-6 weeks after the event.
It is generally believed that the surgeon who is infected chronically with HCV is not a risk to patients if standard infection control practices are maintained. Two individual cases of transmission have been reported from cardiac surgeons to patients [46, 47] , and single cases of transmission by a gynecologist [48] and an orthopedic surgeon [49] have been published. The bigger risk of healthcare-associated transmissions to patients appears to be from contamination of multidose vials for intravenous drug administration combined with lapses in standard infection control practices [50, 51] .
Prevention of Blood Exposure
From the above discussion, it should be apparent that the surgeon and others in the operating room are at risk for bloodborne viral infection. The principal method of prevention of occupational infection is avoidance of blood contact with skin and mucous membranes and strong vigilance in the prevention of percutaneous injury. Studies in the last 20 years have identified blood exposure events in 25%-50% of major operations, which commonly involve more than one member of the operative team [52] [53] [54] [55] . Percutaneous injuries occur less often but are of greater importance for viral transmission. The volume of blood loss during the operation and the duration of the procedure are clinical variables associated with a higher risk of blood exposure. Trauma procedures, cesarean sections, and cardiac operations are associated with the highest incidences of blood exposure.
Barriers
Prevention of virus transmission by the use of barriers has received the greatest attention for prevention of blood exposure in the healthcare setting, especially in the operating room. Eye protection in the operating room, an OSHA mandate, can be achieved by enhancement of conventional glasses with lateral shielding or by wearing specially-designed goggles and other removable eye covers. Shields that are attached to the superior margin of the face mask have been another popular method. Eye protection is available in all operating rooms but continues not to be worn uniformly despite the federal mandate.
The greatest amount of study has been focused on the value of double gloving in avoiding exposure of the hands. Punctures, tears, and fatigue of glove material make blood exposure after two hours of operating time a virtual certainty. In the late 1980s [56] and early 1990s [57] , double gloving was demonstrated to be of value, and a recent 
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review identified the multiple studies that have validated the view that double gloving reduces blood exposure and may reduce the transmission of viral pathogens [58] . An indicator double gloving system has been developed to facilitate recognition that the outer glove has been violated [59] . Despite the clear evidence that double gloving prevents blood exposure of the hands, it still is not employed uniformly. Presumed restriction of hand movement, reduced tactile sensation, and ''claudication'' of the digits are common reasons for not double gloving. The practice of placing a half-size larger glove underneath with the correct glove size over the top has been useful to enhance the comfort of double gloving.
Other tactics include sleeve re-enforcements for operations in the chest or abdomen, where blood breakthrough above the proximal extension of the glove is a risk. Plastic aprons underneath the gown will prevent torso breakthrough but commonly are unbearably hot. Trauma boots to cover the lower extremity to the upper shin or knee are used when large-volume blood loss is anticipated.
Technique
Technical considerations in the prevention of injury and blood exposure in the operating room require constant awareness of sharp instruments and the potential for harm. Double gloving for tying large monofilament suture under tension when closing the abdomen and chest will avoid shearing injuries of the digits. Swaged needles need to be removed before tying the suture. Spent needles need to be introduced tip-down into a polystyrone foam block or some similar medium to eliminate accidental puncture wounds. Blunt needle technology that has been recommended by the ACS should be employed [60] . Blind suturing techniques that employ palpation of needle tips should be avoided. When frequent exchanges of loaded needle holders are required, a Mayo stand can serve as a convenient ''way station'' to avoid injury in passing the loaded needle holder (hands-free technique) [61] . Selected operations may be performed without sharp instrumentation on the surgical field [62] .
Response to exposure event
Despite adherence to all barrier and technical tactics, exposure events will occur inevitably. Blood breakthrough onto the hands should result in immediate rescrubbing. Unfortunately, this commonly is impractical in the middle of a procedure, in which case, the glove is removed, the local site is irrigated with povidone-iodine solution or isopropyl alcohol, and the procedure is completed. These antiseptics are viricidal in the laboratory, but no clinical evidence demonstrates effectiveness in the prevention of transmission of viral infections. Blood exposure from penetration of the surgical gown requires removal of the gown, local irrigation, and regowning.
Multiple parameters should be considered in concluding that a given exposure is high risk (Table 5) . High-risk events should be followed by immediate serologic testing and PEP strategies as described above. Criteria for ''high-risk exposure'' are measured in terms of the likelihood of the patient harboring infection, the magnitude of the exposure event, and the concern that the exposed individual has for potential transmission.
Future Considerations
The transmission of blood-borne pathogens continues to be a risk for members of the surgical team. Whereas HBV infection can largely be prevented with vaccination and HIV has not been documented to have been transmitted in the operating room to the surgeon, HCV infection remains a real risk. It is likely that additional unserotyped hepatitis viruses exist [63] . Additional acute infections such as with West Nile virus, coronovirus of severe acute respiratory syndrome, and the Asian avian influenza virus have a viremic phase that can pose a risk [64] . Recent evidence of transfusion-associated prion disease creates yet another potential risk [65, 66] . The lassitude and indifference of recent years must be reevaluated in the context of the numerous known and unknown infectious agents that are borne in blood.
Avoidance of blood exposure is an important objective in surgical care, and it is the responsibility of surgeons to avoid exposing themselves and others in the operating room environment. We can hope that newer technology in glove design and gown barriers can provide additional protection in the future. Until that time, blood exposure is a personal health risk to the surgeon that must be avoided.
